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Abstract 
The said paper proposes to seak some answers regarding the long term sustainability of the 
pension  system.  Romania’s  pension  system  originates  from  the  invalidity  insurances  and  pension 
system  designed  by  the  German  cancellor  Otto  Eduard  Leopold  von  Bismark  in  1889.  From  a 
European perspective, Romania has to fill an obvious gap regarding the reformation of the national 
public pension system. International experience, particularly of the last 130 years, indicates that, in 
actuality, multiple pension systems have been put into function in most of the world’s countries and 
which are diferenciated by some elements (organizing and managing the system, defyning pension 
rights, method of forming the resources, the pension’s level rapported to the average income etc.) and 
after  the  eficacity  degree  dependent  on  internal  influences,  social,  economic  and  demographic 
environment, and last but not least by the political factor.  
Keywords:  public  pensions  system,  social  securities,  public  politics,  economic 
sustainability, public expenditures. 
1. Introduction 
An increasing number of people are taking into consideration the probability of not 
being  able  to  enjoy  the  advantages  of  a  sufficient  pension  following  a  live’s  work.  The 
affirmation: “I won’t live to see any pension” is often encountered in Romania. The people’s 
fear towards the pension period originates from two equally dark perspectives: on one hand 
the pension’s age limit seems to gradually increase and, on the other hand, many consider the 
pension  will  be  insufficient  to  fulfil  the  consumption  requirements.  For  those  directly 
involved  in  studying,  calculating  and  awarding  the  pensions  (National  House  of  Public 
Pensions, Ministry of Public Finance, Ministry of Labor, Family and Social Protection, The 
National  Prognosis  Comission  and  even  the  Presidential  Comission  for  the  Social  and 
Demographical Risks’ Analysis) – the pension system implies a huge volume of material, 
technical and humanly-trained resources. In addition, the pensions are always a favorite topic 
in the political campaigns in which the politicians’ continously promise higher pensions to an 
electorate that they reward or buy. Although everywhere in the world the pension problem 
and especially that of the high number of pensioners scares the authorities, in Romania the 
situation is really dramatic due to the multiple conditions that fragment the population that is 
able to work. Unfortunately, the politics’ intervention in the economy’s life and structure 
decisively  influences  this  fragmentation  of  the  population.  Due  to  the  precarious  life 
conditions, the lack of working places and the diminished wages, many young people able to 
work prefer to leave the country and work abroad. Not all Romanians that leave contribute to 
the  pension’s  system  and  social  securities,  although  the  incomes  earned  abroad  enter  the 
Romanian banks. Once every four years, the politicians speculate this fact by manipulating 
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the  electorate  through  modifying  the  pensions  in  accordance  with  their  own  interest. 
Consequently,  the  following  have  been  modified:  the  retirement  age,  the  age  differences 
between men and women, the pension point size and the pension’s taxing level. It is very 
difficult  in  these  conditions  to  have  an  equitable  and  sustainable  pension’s  reform  in 
Romania. Such a reform is a sensitive subject for politicians (especially when only think as 
far as electoral cycles and we need politics that produce their effects after 3-5 electoral cycles) 
as well as for society. The pension-regarding public politics need to reconcile the interest for 
reducing expenditures with pensions from the public budget with the right of a decent pension 
for citizens.  
Let  us  instead  begin  with  defyning  the  fact  that  the  pensions  represent
1  a certain 
monetary sum (a financial product), and obtaining it and paying the beneficiaries (pensioners) 
imposes the organization of a specific system which would allow procurement.  
2. Content 
Theoretical background 
Romania’s “step by step” pension system, similar to those in the majority of European 
countries, is a type that originates in the system designed by Bismarck approximately 125 
years ago. 
The most important observation for this system is that it has a mandatory character, 
associated to the individual labor contracts. The system is supported by three parts: employer, 
employee and state.  
Western Europe has taken on Bismarck’s system, thus becoming the model alternative 
for the beveridgean or anglo-saxon insurance system. It is used in many countries members of 
the EU, such as France, Germany, Austria, Belgium, Holland and Romania.  
The characteristics of this model are: 
  the financial resources are mainly represented by the mandatory contributions payed 
by employees and employers; 
  there  are  also  resources  originating  from  the  state  budget’s  subventions  (local  or 
national) or other types of subventions; 
  the  institutions  that  administrate  the  insurance  funds  are  nonprofit;  managing  and 
using  the  insurance  funds  are  realized  on  a  national  level  and  trough  local  fiscal 
administration directions.  
A  short  historic  of  Romania’s  social  insurances  reveals
2  the  fact  that  the  pension 
system originates as far back as 1895, when the mines law and legalization of the first social 
assistance norms appeared. The workers’ rights were awarded in  a first  phase by mutual 
support between them. However, mandatory social insurances were instituted for miners and 
workers  in  the  petroleum  industry  when  the  mine  laws  emerged.  With  this  occasion  the 
pension  right  as  well  as  the  one  to  obtain  compensation  in  case  of  work  accidents  were 
institutionalized, assistance and pension house was established, having their funds assured by 
the  equal  contribution  of  patrons  and  workers.  Later  on,  in  1902  and  due  to  the  jobs’ 
organization, a system of social insurances is established through the Missir law for several 
categories of workmen. Subsequently, the Nitescu law places on legal grounds the principle of 
mandatory  insurances  for  accidents,  diseases  and  eldereness  for  all  employees  of  a 
corporation.  The  first  private  social  security  systems  emerge  in  the  interbleci  period  and 
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function in parallel with the mandatory state social securities. While the state system belonged 
only to the labor contracts’ titulars and to the workers, the private system attracts different 
social categories such as the Romanian Orthodox Church and the creation union’s members. 
Following the great crisis from 1929-1933, the Ioanitescu law unifies social securities on the 
entire  national  territory.  The  law  brings  the  principle  of  contribution  and  solidarity, 
establishes the contribution rate of 6% of the salary and guarantess the pension system by the 
state. Before the Second World War world outburst, in 1938, a new law is adopted that aims 
at supervising the insured people.  
From a legislative point of view, the communist system concentrated on modifying the 
previous law, through the 409 decree from 1945 that stipulated the increase and indexing of 
pensions. The last law from the social security domain that was adopted by the communist 
power in 1977 imposed restrictions for the insurants’ rights.  
After 1989 a hard and troublesome period of legislative modifications started in the 
social securities domain, among which we remind: 
  The no. 70/08.02.1990 Law Decreet – through which modifications were brought to 
the age pensions regyme; 
  The modified and republished no. 118/1190 Law Decreet – regarding the award of 
rights to the people persecuted out of political motivs by the dictatorship that began to 
be installed on March, the 6
th 1945, as well as to those deported or imprisoned; 
  The no. 42/1990 law – for honouring the martire-heroes and awarding some right to 
their followers, to the injured as well as to those that faught for the December 1989 
Revolution’s victory; 
  The no. 73/1991 Law – regarding the establishment of some social security rights, as 
well  as  modifying  and  completing  some  regulations  from  the  social  security  and 
pensions legilastion; 
  The modified and republsished no. 1/1991 Law – regarding the social protection of 
unemployed people and their professional reintegration.  
The effects of all these contradictory evolutions can be sintetized in this manner: 
  the  total  number  of  pensioners  increased  from  3,58  million  in  1990  to  5,401 
million in November 2013 (+50,8%) under the condiions of a decreased number of 
employees from 8,156 million in 1990 to 4,378 million employees in September 
2013 (- 46,32%); 
  the dependency rate
3 has decreased from 3.43 in 1990 to 0,92 in 2001 and 0,93 in 
2013; 
  effective  retiremenet  ages  well  under  the  standard  retirement  age:  in  2009  the 
differences were between 5 and 7 years
4; 
  the dramatic decrease of real net average pension (1990 – 100%) for the 1990-
2000 period (minimum of 44,3% in 2000), its slow increase for the 2001-2006 
period (57-58% in 2006), followed by the spectacular rise from the years 2007-
2009  (the  maximum  point  of  123,8%  being  reached  in  2010)  and  the  relative 
stabilization in the years 2011-2012 situated around the value of 117%; 
  the replacement rate
5 calculated on the base of average pension for an age limit and 
the average net income evolved from 48,6% in 2000, to 65,3% in 2010 and 58,2% 
in 2013 (based on the ground of the year’s first 9 months average net income).  
                                                 
3 The rate of dependency is the rapport between the medium number of employees and the medium number of pensioners. 
4 Mihai Şeitan, Mihaela Arteni, Adriana Nedu, Long term demographic evolution and the pension system’s sustainability, 
Economic Publishing House Bucharest, 2012, page 28 
5 The replacement rate represents the rapport between the pension’s value (simple values, values for age limit and complete 
period of subscription) and the average income value (gross or net), in other words how much of the average net/gross 
income is replaced by the average pension Liviu RADU, Carmen RADU  873 
 
Figure 1 Net pension evolution 
Average net pension of state social securities - REAL 
 
Source: National House of Public Pensions 
In spite of this we can consider that the real reform of state social securities begins 
with the no. 19 law from 2000, which determines the possibility of the social security system 
being accesed by all people who produce income, without only limiting to the labor contracts 
titulars. 
At  EuropeanUnion  level,  including  in  countries  situated  in  Central  and  Eastern 
Europe, the pensions systems are mainly organized
6 as state pensions systems, financed and 
sustained by the state budget, organization mode which has special implications on the public 
finances.  Simoultaneously,  when  we  speak  of  the  method  of  organizing  and  financing 
different types of public pensions systems that exist at the level of European Union’s member 
states  but  especially  whenwe speak of their financial sustainability, we need to take into 
account the more accentuated tendency of the population to age along with being consolidated 
with the financial constraints. Determined elements such as the ones below must be taken into 
account in order to classify the pension systems: 
1.  Firstly after the financing mode we distinguish a) pay as to go type systems (PAYG) 
2.  which function on the principle of social solidarity, meaning that the employee pays, 
as long as he is active, a contribution that will become the future generations’ pension 
and b) systems privately financed or administrated by the employee or employer’s 
contribution; 
3.  Based on legal ground and method of establishment, there are systems established by 
law or by collective labor contract; 
4.  Based on the mode of participating to the system they can be mandatory or volunteer; 
5.  After the type of benefits there are systems in which the obtained benefits vary in 
accordance with the results of investing the participants’ fund actions and systems in 
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which a certain benefit is being established and the contributions are being calculated 
in order to reach that cetain benefit. Most of the majority of European countries is 
included in this last type of defined benefits, with the exception of Germany, Slovakia 
and Romania which have a point’s system
8. 
The pension system is sustained in the European Union by three pillars: the first pillar 
belongs to the pensions regulated by law, totally financed by third shares – social security 
contributions from participants to the public pensions system. It is a pay as to go (PAYG) 
type  of  system  in  which  countries  such  as  Bulgaria,  Estonia,  Latvia,  Livonia,  Hungary, 
Poland, Slovakia and Romania. The second pillar is formed by pensions established by the 
labor contract (through collective or individual stipulations) named occupational pensions, 
strictly  connected  to  the  working  place  in  countries  such  as  Bulgaria,  Polland,  Hungary, 
Romania or Slovenia. The third pillar of individual stipulations, unrelated to the occupation. 
The members are mainly, and not mandatory, employees with the possibility of collectively 
adhering (through sindicates or associations). The participation is not required by law, the 
employers or state can contribute to this system. 
Comparison between the private pension systems in Poland, Hungary and Romania (at 
the second pillon level) 
  
POLAND 
PRIVATE PENSION’S 
SYSTEM ORGANIZATION 
THE SYSTEM’S 
GUARANTEES 
DEVELOPING THE 
MARKET ON THE 
2
ND PILLAR LEVEL* 
Pilon  I- Mandatory 
•  Pay  as  You  Go,  Definite 
contributions,  virtual  accounts  - 
conturi virtuale -reformed in 1999 
•Ocupational  public  pensions 
schemes 
Pillar II - Mandatory 
Defined  contributions,  individual 
accounts,  
7,3%  from  the  gross  income 
contributions 
Mandatory for those under 30 years 
Optional  for  those  with  ages 
between 31 and 50 
Introduced in 1999 
Pillar III-Optional 
•Definite  contributions,  optional 
ocupational  plans  introduced  in 
1999 
•Personal  optional  schemes 
introduced in 2004 
•Rezerve  fund,  on  demographic 
grounds 
•RETIREMENT 65 men / 60 woman 
Performance minimum relative 
assurance   
Minimum rate of productivity – the 
smallest value between: 
 --the market’s average capacity for 
the last 3 years minus 4 percentage 
points and 
 -50% of the balanced capacity rate 
annualized for the last 3 years 
The administrator’s funds must 
cover any potential deficits 
The national guarantee fund’s 
resources are used in case the 
administrator enters bankrupcy  
That  which  cannot  be  covered  by 
this  fund  is  assured  by  the  state’s 
treasury. 
14,36  mil.  participants  - 
Pillar II 
14 administrators 
43,76  active  gross  billion 
euros  
14,11% balance in the GDP  
MAXIMUM LIMITS 
FOR PLACEMENTS  
40 % actions 
40%  mortgage,  municipal 
or corporate obligations,  
20% depozited 
Statistically  –  31  %  of 
assets are placed in actions 
MAXIMUM 
PERMITED 
COMISSIONS  
3,5%  of  contributions,  in 
2010 
Comissions  in  terms  of 
fund  size.  0,54%/year  of 
the small funds actives and 
0,06%/year  of  the  net 
actives, in terms of capacity 
Transfer  of  23  –  42  de 
euros (<2 years) 
HUNGARY 
THE PRIVATE PENSION’S 
SYSTEM ORGANIZATION 
SYSTEM GUARANTEES   
Pillar  I- Mandotary 
•Pay as You Go, reformed in 1995 
Pillar II - Mandatory 1998 
•No  performance  guarantees, 
only indirect guarantees   
•Hungary  has  a  special  fund 
3,02  mil. participants – Pillar  
II 
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Defined contributions, individual 
accounts, Contributions of 8% out of 
the gross income (possibility of an 
additional 2%) Mandatory for those 
under the age of 35 
Optional for the rest of employees  
Pillar III- Optional 1994 
•Defined contributions, individual 
accounts 
Pillar IV- Optional 2007 
Launched for occupational pensions  
•RETIREMENT 62 men / 62 women 
for  protecting  the  capital 
ccumulation,  financed  through 
mandatory  trimestrial 
contributions,  between  0,3  and 
0,5% of contributions   
•The  special  fund  protects  the 
retirements’  total  benefit  and 
the  contributors’  accumulated 
capital in case of insolvency. 
  Capacity objectives need to be 
established, however failure has 
no consequences. 
 
Gross  assets  of  9,63  billion 
euros 
10, DEVELOPING THE 
MARKET ON THE 2
ND 
PILLAR LEVEL 34 % of 
the GDP 
MAXIMUM LIMITS 
FOR PLACEMENTS 
50 % stocks, 30% obligations, 
25% mortgage obligations, 
10% in mortgage funds, 5 % in 
hedging funds 
MAXIMUM PERMITED 
COMISSIONS 
4,5% of contributions 
0,,66%  a  month  for  gross 
stocks  –  management 
comission 
ROMANIA 
THE PRIVATE PENSION’S 
SYSTEM ORGANIZATION 
SYSTEM GUARANTEES  DEVELOPING THE 
MARKET ON THE 2
ND 
PILLAR* LEVEL 
Pillar  I    PAYG  type  –  the  pension 
points system 
Pillar II-Mandatory/Optional 2007 
Defined contributions, individual 
acoounts, 
Contributions of 2,5 % (10,5% out of 
the gross income) – 6% since 2016  
Mandatory for those under the age of 
35 Optional pentru employees with 
ages between 35 -45 
Separation exist between 
administrator and fund. 
Pillar III-Optional 
•Optional pensions, contributions of 
max 15% from income, individual 
accounts  
•RETIREMENT 65 men / 60 women 
(2015) 
Relative  guarantee  of 
performance 
Minimum  level  of 
profitability, calculated on risk 
Absolute guarantee 
The  total  rightful  sum  for  the 
private  pension  cannot  be 
smaller  the  value  of  payed 
contributions,  diminished  with 
transfer  penalties  and  legal 
comissions. 
Other safety elements 
Romania disposes of the largest 
range  of  risk  control 
instruments:  assets  separation, 
actuarial  funds,  revision 
through  depositary,  guarantee 
fund, audit, minimum profitable 
rate.  The  guarantee  fund  is 
destined  for  covering  some 
risks that are umpredictable and 
are  not  covered  by  technical 
commission. 
 
4,57  mil. participants - Pillar II 
12 administrators 
0,56 billion euros gross assets 
0,49 % balance in the GDP 
MAXIMUM LIMITS 
FOR PLACEMENTS 
20% in instruments monetary 
market 
70% state titles  
30% titles emited by local 
administrations 
50% actions 
5% corporative obligations  
5% mutual funds 
MAXIMUM PERMITED 
COMISSIONS 
Max. 2,5% of contributions 
Max. 0,05% / month of the 
active gross 
Source: Adaptation by Dan Zăvoianu – Comparison between private pensions system of type pillar II and the 
world’s states markets – Communication Direction – CSSPP, Bucharest, july 2010 
* at the level of December 2009 
In spite of these, in the evaluation of different pension plans we must also take into 
account  what  goes  on  in  practice,  since  it  has  been  observed  that  the  sum  saved  by  the 
population is relatively constant in a certain period. If a certain saving system is imposed, the 
sums saved through other methods will drop
7.Therefore, the economic growth shouldn’t be 
related to the specific methods of composing the pension systems, of the existence or lack of 
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acumulation funds, even if they constitute important sources for investments. On the other 
hand
8, the largest part of pension funds is placed, in order to avoid investment risk,  in state 
titles,  thus  in  the  public  duty.  Indeed  it  is  expected  for  the  private  pensions’  fund 
managemenet to be prudential and to, thus, avoid faiure but relatively small acumulations of 
contributions for the system will result. The Global Bank’s and European Union’s notice of 
the  differences  of  approaching  the  pensions  reform  is  very  important  to  us,  since  in  the 
treatment applied to the Global Bank (also sustained by the International Monetary Fund as 
the low level of incomes is generally concerned, and that of the pensions, as a method of 
controlling inflation by reducing cosumption). Obviously, Romania was not the only one to 
suffer such an influence, but other ex-socialist european countries. We should keep in mind 
that  the  differences  mentioned  here  between  the  EU  and  Global  Bank  are  not  disputed 
directly, but rather by reciprocal ignorance of the projects between each side. Therefore, in the 
Global Bank’s studies, the public pensions schemes are considered to be inadequate, hard to 
reform, represent a blocage for the economic growth and are recomended for the governments 
of coutnries assisted to not repeat the „expensive mistakes of industrialized countries”
9 
On the other hand, in the EU, the pensions’ system reform is  aimed at  not  being 
realized  in  the  detriment  of  actual  beneficiaries,  so  not  through  diminishing  the  public 
system’s  role,  which  is  the  most  expanded  and  will  remain  the  main  system,  but  which, 
however,  does  not  represent  the  only  solution.  An  equitable  inter-generational  balance,  a 
satisfying level of pensions, sustainability and modernims
10 could be reached through reform 
measures that could also imply discounts of public pensions’ quantity (which are in fact very 
generous in other countries). 
Consequently, a pensioner can have one or more pensions, with financing from one 
source or many such sources. Theoretically, the more the pension sources multiply, the more 
the chance of covering in a larger area the requirements for an acceptable life standard is 
expected to grow. However, this fact does not happen automatically if the pensions’ cuantum 
is small from each source and per total the optimum level of financial resources may not be 
reached.  
The  most  disadvantaged  and  highly  improbable  situations  would  be  those  through 
which  the  target-population  could  not  be  covered,  although  many  sources  and  types  of 
pensions exist, and/or the added quantum of pensions which would have been insured by a 
single system/single pension could not be supplied. Natural it would be to aim at obtaining 
high  performances  of  supplying  incomes  to  the  beneficiaries,  within  every 
system/source/pension. If two or several systems do not exceed the accumulated performance 
which could be obtained through a single one, introducing them would be unjustified if we 
consider the fact that this would also imply a high level of administration costs in comparison 
to the function of a single one.  
The danger of the pension system collapsing has left Romania, for a medium and long 
term, but its sustainability is still discussed. On the background of occupying the labor force 
with negative tendencies, the population’s rapid aging and that of demographic involution 
which  is  announced  to  be  disastreous  (The  National  Statistics  Institute  foresees  that  the 
population  will  drop  until  2060  with  approximately  seven  million  people),  the  pensions 
system will not manage to offer the necessary social protection to future pensioners and will 
become a death rock on economy’s neck (affecting investments in productive sectors and 
increasing fiscality). After recalculating the pension system for the year 2010, it has become 
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more equitable, being relatively simple to apply and easier to understand. In this context, last 
year’s measures have favorited sustainability.  
In our country the actual pension system has three pillars, similar to other European 
Union’s countries, such as: 
Pillar I public pay as you go pensions budget with defined benefits, reglementat by the 
law 263 from 2010 according to which the employee’s contribution is of 10,5% of the gross 
income salary and the employer’s contribution is of 20,8% in rapport with the employee’s 
gross salary.  
Pillar II the mandatory pensions fund, reglemented by the law 411 from 2004 and 
characterized by: 
  Mandatory participation for employees under 35 years and optional for those with ages 
between 35 and 45; 
  The contribution (in 2013) of 4% out of the employer’s gross income is in fact a part 
of the contribution owned in Pillar I; 
  Minimum  investing  guarantees  –  the  real  sum  of  all  contributions  from  which 
administration comissions are deducted. 
Pilonul III optional pensions fund, reglemented by the 204 law of 2006, in which 
participating is optional, it is privately admnistrated and the profit cannot guaranteed. In this 
pillar the contribution is of 15% maximum in rapport to the gross income, it is a contribution 
unitively  suported  by  the  employee  and  employer  and  is  encouraged  through  fiscal 
deductability. 
Several studies came out in the last years with detailed refferance to the alternatives of 
public politics in the pensions domain. Therefore, in 2012, Expert Forum published Working 
Paper 3 entitled „Who will pay the pensions of the „decree people” in 2030? Romania’s 
situation in the context comparative to the EU and 7 scenarios of evolution of the public 
pensions system”. 
Thus, according to the most plausible scenario, the pensions fund’s deficit will be of 
max. 2,5% of the GDP in 2019 provided that the legislation will be kept in the actual form. In 
2042  the  fund  wil  reach  a  deficit  of  aproximately  1,2%  of  the  GDP.  The  pension  as  a 
percentage of the gross average income, which is presently of 37% will decrease to 24% in 
2031. The study’s conclusion is that depending on the alternance of political parties with left 
or right ideology, an accent will either be put on the social component or on reducing the 
deficit from the GDP. In the case of social component the levels grow from contributions 
directed towards the 2
nd pillar at 10%, the GDP deficit can grow with 0,62% as oposed to the 
initial scenary, but the rate of replacing incomes with pension is improving by 2%. In case the 
GDP’s deficit reducement is required, the retirement age will grow up to 65 years and after a 
deficit of maximum 2% of the GDP in the year 2019, the fund will equilibrate. However, the 
pension system will represent the trial point of any government even 50 years from now, 
which is the conclusion entitled „Social risks and inequities in Romania”, published in 2009 
by the Presidential Comission for Social and Demographic Risks Analysis
11. 
According to the said study, the retired population (with ages of 65 and higher) is in a 
continous growth while the number of employees is decreasing dramatically: 
  a few gemerations have started to enter the labor market from 2008, and the number of 
employees will not rise very much even in the eventuality of a constant economic 
growth. As a reuslt, resorting to imigrants will become a necessitty in the next five-six 
years, when the labor force youth entries will be very little and reduced by the rising 
share of students in each cohort and by the already too few young people that will 
leave the country for better payed jobs in the West; 
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  starting with 2030-2035 the new-born children, which will probably be less numerous, 
of the transaction generation will enter the labor market. Only a redression of the 
fertility rate (which should reach from 1,3 the EU medium term average of at least 1,5 
and on a long term 1,7 – 1,8), corelated with an adjustmenet of migrational inflows 
would reduce this process;  
  the problem of elderly people that lack pension and health insurance will especially be 
noticeable after 2025 when the people that are curently unemployed or working on the 
black market will reach advanced ages without beneficiating of pensions or health 
insurances, and the costs of minimal services for them will have to be supported by the 
social assistance system.  
3. Conclusions 
As  we  have  previosuly  shown,  the  tendencies  of  evolution  for  the  population’s 
structure are negative and will be followed by its accelerated aging. Presently, the population 
that surpasses the age of 65 is of 3,3 million people which means 16% of the total population. 
In  2020  the  pensioners  will  represent  3,6  million,  namely  17%  of  the  country’s  total 
population and if it will follow the same ascending trend, by the middle of the century the 
pensioners will represent 30% of the total. Simoultaneous with the population’s aging we are 
assisting to a decreasing natality and the increase of the elderly’s dependecy raport. In graphic 
2 we can notice the dependcy level of youth and elderly in the total of dependent people. As it 
can  be  observed,  the  total  number  of  dependents  tends  to  reach  half  of  the  country’s 
population since imigrants and uninsured people are added to the youth and elderly. This data 
does not take into account the disabled population.    
Fig. 2 Dependency rapport between active and retired people 
 
Source: INS, Projecting the active population on the 2050 – 2013 horizon 
 
We  must  not  forget  that  after  the  year  1990  the  process  of  gradual  decrease  of 
population began, and from 2008 a smaler number of young people started to enter the labor 
market.  As  a  matter  of  fact  the  predictions  regarding  the  country’s  total  population  are 
allready known. Presently we are aproximatenly 20 million people, followed in 2020 by little 
over 18,2 million and in 2060 we will reach aproximately 13 million inhabitants.  
The public system in Romania is similar in many aspects to the one in most of the 
European  Union’s  member  states,  which  are  type  Bismarck  systems.  In  this  case,  the 
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financing method is, as we have previously shown, a „pay as you go”  type, which impplies 
that the system is based on redistribution (pensioners are payed from the actual wage earners’ 
contribution),  thus  creating  a  dependency  between  retired  people  and  active  population 
(measured through the dependecy rapport).  
Pension systems in the EU’s coutnries as well as the one in Romania are influenced by 
the changes of demographic indicators. The population’s aging is one of the most important 
burdens of this system, being a phenomen which leads the dependency rate’s growth.  
Taking in consideration this situation, we can observe that the actual level of social 
contributions  is  unsustainable  on  a  long  term.  Context  in  which  Romania  proposes  the 
folowing  for  the  2014-2020  period,  according  to  the  European  Comission’s  partnership 
agreement: „70% of the population with ages between 20 and 64 should be employed” – in 
regard  to  the  rate  of  occupying  the  labor  force,  a  ground  element  in  sustaining  a  viable 
pensions system; and „the number of people exposed to the poverty or exclusion risk should 
be 580 000 less (in comparison to the 2008 levels).
12” 
In  conformity  with  these  objectives,  our  country  considers  as  oppourtune  the 
following measures: 
  combating illegal labor; 
  promoting the employment of elderly workers; 
  improving the participation on the labor market, as well as the level of occupancy and 
labor force productivity by reviewing and consolidating the active politics regarding 
the labor market; 
  assuring training and individualized services and promoting life-long studying; 
  increasing  the  capacity  of  the  National  Agency  for  Labor  Force  Occupation  to 
improve the quality and degree of coverage of their services; 
  combating unemployment among young people, rapidly implementing the National 
Plan for Young People’s Employment. 
Reforming the pension system is mandatory and it must represent a priority for the 
public politics of any government. 
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